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Clearing the Air: The Misguided Ruling of EME 
Homer and the Future of Interstate Pollution 
Regulation  
“Administrative law is not for sissies.”1 
INTRODUCTION 
Justice Scalia is right—administrative law is certainly not for 
sissies. The ever-expanding role of the federal government means 
amplified power for our federal agencies, those entities responsible 
for implementing the policy goals of our government.2 This increased 
responsibility of federal agencies comes from congressionally passed 
statutes increasing or modifying the authority of the particular agency 
it pertains to. Many of these agencies regulate pursuant to 
exceedingly wordy and confusing statutes that deal with very 
complex issues; these statutes define the metaphorical “red tape.” 
Indeed, administrative law is not for sissies.  
The Supreme Court, in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Defense 
Resource Council Inc., formulated one of the most important judicial 
principles in the administrative law realm.3 The seminal legal doctrine 
that emerged from that case stressed judicial deference to 
“reasonable” agency interpretations of ambiguous statutory texts.4 A 
basic rationale used in support of judicial deference, both before and 
after the Chevron decision, is that agencies, because of their expertise 
in their regulatory area, are more likely than a court to reach a correct 
result policy-wise.5 It is also true, however, that many federal judges 
consider it their duty to say what the law is. Thus, in the years since 
Chevron, many courts have rolled back the degree of judicial 
deference in many areas of administrative law.6 
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The Clean Air Act was enacted by Congress in 1970 as the 
principal source of Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 
authority in regulating the country’s air pollution.7 Because of the 
vast amount of regulations the national environment demands, 
Congress, through the Clean Air Act, delegated a large amount of 
power to the EPA in setting air quality standards.8 Interstate 
pollution, or the transport of fine particulate matter pollutants across 
state lines, is an area of utmost importance in environmental 
regulatory efforts.9 Research suggests that these sorts of pollutants 
cause the premature deaths of thousands of people annually,10 as 
well as causing drastic increases in healthcare costs from respiratory 
illness.11 The EPA’s authority to regulate interstate pollution is 
derived from the Clean Air Act’s good neighbor provision,12 a 
statute that Congress has periodically amended in order to give the 
EPA a greater amount of regulatory authority over such pollution.13 
However, the D.C. Circuit, in invalidating the last two major EPA 
regulatory schemes addressing the issue, has proven to be a 
significant barrier to its effective regulation.  
The D.C. Circuit’s most recent opinion concerning interstate 
pollution, EME Homer City Generation, L.P. v. EPA, likely posits 
the most significant setback yet to EPA regulatory efforts. The D.C. 
panel’s majority opinion misapplied prior case law to substantiate a 
rationale and ruling that clearly appeared to conflict with 
congressional intent regarding interstate pollution.14 The holding 
further muddles the D.C. Circuit’s stance with regard to an already 
complex statutory framework, and thus harms all parties with an 
interest in future interstate pollution regulation. 
While the panel’s ruling was likely welcomed by those who 
consider increased environmental regulation to be a hindrance upon 
future economic development, a closer reading of the majority 
opinion suggests that some states, including Louisiana, may be 
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subject to far harsher interstate pollution regulations in the future.15 
The court focused on alerting the EPA as to what data the agency 
must gather in order to permissibly regulate interstate air pollution 
of the states under the Clean Air Act.16 Specifically, the panel held 
that the EPA may only require each state to reduce its own precise 
contribution to the interstate pollution problem.17 To be sure, while 
it is unclear whether it is even possible for the EPA to make such 
determinations, this “relativity requirement” poses serious concerns 
to Louisiana.18  
Louisiana’s status as a state that both contributes to, and 
receives, interstate air pollution suggests that the state will suffer all 
of the drawbacks from the EME Homer ruling while gaining none of 
the benefits.19 Moreover, as natural gas and coal-fired power plants 
are the principal sources of interstate air pollution, it stands that 
Louisiana’s electricity sources will likely be subject to far heavier 
future regulations in the wake of the ruling.  
The prospect of far greater emissions restrictions on Louisiana’s 
electricity sources would have significant damaging effects upon the 
state due to the character of its major industries. Louisiana’s 
economy relies heavily on energy-intensive industries, such as 
petrochemical manufacturing20 and petroleum refining and 
production,21 making the state among the highest in per capita 
energy consumption.22  
This Comment argues that the future successful regulation of 
interstate air pollution is now clearly in jeopardy because of the D.C. 
Circuit’s decision to replace the EPA’s reasonable approach to the 
problem with its own misguided policy choices. Part I provides an 
overview of the regulatory process under the Clean Air Act and the 
specific provisions addressing interstate pollution. Part II examines 
the three most recent D.C. Circuit decisions over transport pollution 
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regulations. Part III critically analyzes the EME Homer panel’s 
erroneous interpretation of the Clean Air Act, the court’s 
misapplication of prior case law, and explores the adverse 
consequences this most recent decision poses. Part IV reviews the 
legislative history behind congressional statutes involving interstate 
pollution and summarizes its apparent conflict with the D.C. 
Circuit’s ruling. This part also suggests possible regulatory 
approaches the EPA might take to adhere to both the panel’s ruling 
and the legislative intent. Part V concludes that, absent the chance of 
a successful appeal or legislative revision, the EPA will likely be 
unable to implement effective interstate pollution regulations in the 
aftermath of EME Homer.  
I. THE EPA’S REGULATORY ROLE UNDER THE CLEAN AIR ACT 
The Clean Air Act of 1970 established the federal government’s 
powerful role in air pollution regulation.23 Prior to the Act, the 
federal government’s function regarding the country’s environment 
was largely centered on research.24 While proponents acknowledged 
that the federal role in air pollution control would drastically 
increase at the expense of the states, it was also stressed that state 
participation as implementers of federal standards was crucial to the 
Act’s success.25  
The Supreme Court, in Train v. Natural Resources Defense 
Council, Inc., reiterated these distinct and separate roles of the states 
and the EPA under the Clean Air Act.26 From the plain text of the 
Act, the Court reasoned that the EPA is charged to set national air 
quality standards.27 These air standards are to be set at pollution 
levels that the EPA deems necessary to protect the public health.28 
However, the Court noted that the statute aimed to limit the EPA to 
a secondary role in implementing these air quality standards.29  
Because the Act stated that “each State shall have the primary 
responsibility of assuring air quality within its boundaries,” the 
Court concluded that Congress intended to allow states 
“considerable latitude” when implementing these standards.30 Thus, 
through the Clean Air Act, Congress devised a cooperative approach 
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toward pollution control, where both the federal government and 
states play important roles.31 
A. State Implementation of National Air Quality Standards 
Under the Clean Air Act, states assure air quality within their own 
boundaries by implementing and enforcing state implementation 
plans.32 A state implementation plan, or “SIP,” is the overall 
regulatory scheme through which a state controls pollution.33 States 
revise their plans either on their own initiative or in response to 
federal mandates, such as when the EPA modifies air quality 
standards.34 These revisions are then submitted to the EPA, which 
must then approve or disapprove of these revisions.35  
In some state submittals, the EPA may determine that a group of 
submitted state plans are substantially inadequate to meet the 
national air quality standards, and thus significant changes are 
necessary.36 This process, known as a “SIP Call,”37 allows the EPA 
to require states to address these shortcomings.38 The EPA is 
obligated to notify these states and afford them an opportunity to 
correct inadequacies.39 In the event a state fails to submit an 
acceptable plan, the EPA is required to create a federal 
implementation plan for that state within two years of finding the 
state plan inadequate.40  
B. The Good Neighbor Provision  
The good neighbor provision requires that states’ implementation 
plans include adequate measures which will prevent any “emissions 
activity within the State from emitting any air pollutant in amounts 
which will . . . contribute significantly to nonattainment in, or 
interfere with maintenance by, any other State . . . .”41 In other words, 
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states are prohibited from interfering with any other state’s ability to 
meet national air quality standards. Such interference occurs through 
the process of transport pollution or when a state emits air pollutants 
that are then blown into other states’ territories.42  
The original Clean Air Act of 1970 casually addressed this 
problem through a statutory requirement that states engage in 
“intergovernmental cooperation” to reduce pollution transport.43 
However, this original measure proved completely incapable of 
effectively addressing interstate pollution.44 Thus, in 1977, Congress 
amended the provision by requiring that states, in their state 
implementation plans, prohibit emissions from certain pollution 
sources that would “prevent [another state’s] attainment” of federal 
air quality standards.45 This revision also proved unsuccessful in 
preventing pollution transport. The statutory language required 
actual evidence that a polluting state was responsible for another 
state’s nonattainment, which was essentially impossible for the EPA 
because of the complexity of interstate pollution.46 
It was the “downwind” states in the Northeast that, suffering the 
brunt of the negative effects posed by transport pollution, pushed for 
the current good neighbor provision, which was added to the Clean 
Air Act of 1990.47 Specifically, these states experienced increases in 
health problems linked to deteriorating air quality48 caused by the 
interstate transport of particulate matter pollutants from heavy 
polluting coal-burning utilities in the Midwest.49 The heavier 
polluting, “upwind” states, in turn argued that, while interstate air 
pollution was a significant problem, the burden of reducing such 
pollution needed to be shared equally among all states.50 In 
response, Congress replaced the “prevent attainment” requirement 
with the “significantly contribute” language in order to strengthen 
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the enforceability of the good neighbor provision.51 This revision 
allowed the EPA to address interstate pollution as a collective 
problem, as opposed to the state-specific approach, which the 
“prevent attainment” language suggested.52  
Because of the complexity associated with interstate pollution, 
the problem is not solely a struggle between the Midwestern 
polluting states and the affected Eastern states.53 Rather, several 
states are both contributors and recipients of transport pollution.54 
Predictably, despite Congress’s 1990 statutory change, the 
successful enforcement of the good neighbor provision has been rife 
with problems for a number of reasons.55 States often have 
conflicting social and economic interests with regard to interstate 
pollution, resulting in varied degrees of willingness to solve the 
problem.56  
Moreover, the overall make-up of the Clean Air Act has 
expectedly made successful regulation more problematic by 
assigning the task of implementing federal standards to the states.57 
Specifically, federal regulation of the interstate pollution problem is 
difficult because states have tended to aggressively challenge 
regulations that they deem contrary to their interests. EPA 
regulations that are less restrictive on the polluting states are 
predictably challenged by the downwind states for not going far 
enough to solve the problem; likewise, upwind states challenge good 
neighbor regulations they deem to be overly harsh.58  
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However, when states have sought court protection, judicial 
intervention has, more often than not, increased uncertainty in the 
application of the good neighbor provision due to the D.C. Circuit’s 
inconsistent interpretations of the statute’s “significantly contribute” 
language.59 Scholars have noted the difficulty in finding a suitable 
definition of “significantly contribute” in the realm of interstate 
pollution due to the complexity of transport pollution.60 Indeed, over 
the past twelve years, the last three major interstate regulatory 
schemes have ended up in the D.C. Circuit, with the court failing to 
provide the EPA with a clear understanding as to what is 
permissible under the good neighbor provision.  
II. D.C. CIRCUIT CASE LAW: THE GOOD NEIGHBOR PROVISION 
A. Michigan v. EPA 
In Michigan v. EPA, the court considered a Final EPA Rule, or 
“SIP Call,” which directed twenty-two states, who the EPA deemed 
“significant contributors,” to revise their state implementation plans 
to eliminate nitrogen oxide emissions by amounts that could be 
removed for $2,000 or less per ton.61 The State of Michigan 
contended that the rule exceeded the EPA’s statutory authority 
under the Clean Air Act.62 Michigan argued that the EPA’s decision 
to set a uniform, cost-based reduction for all upwind states would 
force some states to reduce their emissions beyond what was 
required by the good neighbor provision.63 Further, Michigan 
asserted that the EPA’s new procedure of notifying upwind states of 
their good neighbor obligations before they were to submit their 
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state implementation plans interfered with the states’ statutory right 
to choose how to meet these requirements.64  
1. The Majority Opinion 
The court rejected Michigan’s cost argument, holding that this 
assertion ignored congressional intent behind the amended 1990 
good neighbor provision.65 The panel reasoned that the legislature’s 
shift added a greater amount of ambiguity to the statute,66 
suggesting that Congress did not purport to require that the EPA 
determine polluting states solely from their emission levels.67 
Moreover, the majority pointed out that the good neighbor provision 
contained no express exclusion of considerations of costs.68 Thus, 
given the statute’s silence on the issue, the court held that the EPA’s 
use of costs was permissible under the good neighbor provision.69  
The court also considered Michigan’s assertion that the nitrogen 
oxide budget program infringed on the statutory right of the states to 
choose how they meet the federal requirements.70 To substantiate 
their argument, the petitioners pointed to an earlier D.C. Circuit 
decision, Virginia v. EPA, where the court held that the EPA may 
not compel states to adopt a specific approach to achieve their 
obligations under the Clean Air Act.71 The Michigan court rejected 
this argument and held that the budget program did not violate state 
autonomy because the rule was merely an EPA recommendation, 
not a requirement; therefore, the states were still free to decide how 
to meet these emission limits.72 
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2. Judge Sentelle’s Dissent 
In his dissent, Judge Sentelle took strong issue with the 
majority’s willingness to accept the EPA’s consideration of costs in 
determining a state’s significant contribution.73 He argued that, as 
indicated by the text of the good neighbor provision, Congress 
clearly intended that such significant contributions be determined 
based solely on state emissions that affected the pollution levels in 
other states.74 In support of this argument, Judge Sentelle cited the 
circuit’s decision in Ethyl Crop v. EPA, where the court struck down 
an EPA rule, holding that where “[t]he plain language of the 
provision makes [it] clear that . . . decisions are to be based on one 
criterion,” the EPA cannot base its decision on another criteria.75  
B. North Carolina v. EPA 
In North Carolina v. EPA, petitioners challenged the EPA’s 
Clean Air Interstate Rule and its method for quantifying state 
contributions.76 In the rule, the EPA did not measure each upwind 
state’s actual contributions, but instead assigned the states initial 
emission targets based on each particular state’s costs of reduction. 
Further, the rule established a cap-and-trade system of interstate 
allowance trading which enabled all major power plants to freely 
trade emission allowances in order to comply with emission 
standards.77  
North Carolina, as a downwind state, argued that the Clean Air 
Interstate Rule did not adequately ensure that the significant 
contributions to the pollution levels of downwind states would be 
eliminated.78 Principally, North Carolina argued that the EPA’s 
regional approach toward eliminating upwind pollution, by not 
requiring elimination on a state-by-state basis, did not go as far as 
the good neighbor provision required.79  
The court unanimously struck down the rule for exceeding the 
EPA’s authority under the good neighbor provision.80 The court 
reasoned that, because the rule’s cap-and-trade system allowed 
unlimited allowance trading between states, it failed to ensure that 
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each state’s respective significant contribution would be eliminated 
as statutorily required.81 The court aptly pointed out that a state 
could evade its good neighbor obligation if the power plants within 
that state simply purchased enough emission credits.82  
Further, the court stated that the Clean Air Interstate Rule’s 
system of allocating emissions credits was based on impermissible 
cost considerations.83 The program allocated fewer emission credits 
to states that could control emissions more cheaply.84 As a result, 
states with gas-fired and oil-fired power sources, whose emissions 
were less costly to control, were shouldered with greater reduction 
obligations than those with coal-fired sources.85 The court 
considered such a system impermissible when the statute required 
that each state individually eliminate its own contribution.86 
The North Carolina decision raised serious doubts as to whether 
the EPA could maintain a cap-and-trade system under the good 
neighbor provision.87 To be sure, the ruling certainly suggested that 
the EPA must restrict interstate allowance trading and place actual 
emission limits on state contributions for such a system to be 
lawful.88 Moreover, the D.C. panel’s rejection of the Clean Air 
Interstate Rule posited an extremely difficult challenge for the EPA 
in formulating a permissible interstate rule under the Clean Air Act. 
Specifically, the EPA was required to replace the Rule with 
interstate regulations that would not be considered overbearing 
towards the upwind states while simultaneously ensuring that the 
new regulations would adequately protect the downwind states as 
the good neighbor provision required. 
C. EME Homer City Generation L.P. v. EPA 
In response to the North Carolina ruling, the EPA formulated 
the Transport Rule, its most recent effort to issue regulations in 
compliance with the good neighbor provision.89 The EPA, through 
air quality monitoring, first determined the states that would be 
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considered significant contributors.90 Next, the EPA established a 
uniform, cost-based reduction scheme similar to the nitrogen oxide 
budget program in Michigan.91 These cost-based thresholds were 
determined through computer modeling, which suggested the 
thresholds in which downwind states’ air quality problems would be 
alleviated.92  
The Transport Rule also limited the ability of power plants to 
trade allowances using three important measures.93 First, the rule 
included strict penalties for power plants that exceeded their 
allowable pollution levels.94 This induced utilities to hold on to their 
allowances in order to avoid penalties if they exceeded emission 
levels.95 Next, the rule severely restricted the buying and selling of 
allowances between different states.96 Lastly, the EPA prohibited 
utilities from using allowance credits from the Clean Air Interstate 
Rule to meet the early emission requirements of the Transport 
Rule.97 
As the EPA stated in its published Transport Rule, the agency 
considered its approach to comply with both the Michigan and 
North Carolina interpretations of the good neighbor provision.98 
First, the EPA claimed it had “faithfully responded to the cited 
aspects of North Carolina” by refraining from setting emission 
budgets based on the states’ pollution control costs and severely 
limiting the interstate trading of allowances.99 Moreover, the 
Transport Rule’s approach was consistent with the Michigan 
decision, as it used air-quality monitoring at the outset to determine 
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which states were significant contributors.100 Furthermore, the 
EPA’s use of uniform-cost reductions was consistent with the 
regulations approved in the Michigan decision.101 
The EPA also deviated from its previous approaches by 
concurrently releasing states’ significant contributions and the 
federal plan stipulating how the states were to reduce these 
contributions.102 Unlike the rules at issue in Michigan and North 
Carolina, the Transport Rule ultimately never gave states the 
opportunity to choose how they would meet these emission 
requirements. Instead, these states became subject to the mandatory 
federal requirements in the Transport Rule following its 
promulgation.103  
In defending this approach, the EPA pointed to the states’ clear 
failure to submit adequate state implementation plans as required by 
the Clean Air Act.104 The EPA emphasized that nothing in the Clean 
Air Act made these state plan submissions dependent on any prior 
action by the EPA.105 The EPA also pointed to the Clean Air Act’s 
mandate that the EPA promulgate an adequate federal 
implementation plan in the event the states fail to do so.106 Lastly, 
the EPA pointed to the North Carolina panel’s directive to the 
agency to quickly remedy the flaws in the Clean Air Interstate 
Rule.107 Nevertheless, a number of power and coal companies, labor 
unions, trade associations, states, and local governments petitioned 
for judicial review following the Transport Rule’s issuance.108  
1. The Majority Opinion 
The majority struck down the Transport Rule.109 First, the court 
held that the Transport Rule exceeded EPA authority under the 
Clean Air Act according to the prior statutory interpretations in 
Michigan and North Carolina.110 The court acknowledged that, 
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while the Michigan court allowed the EPA to consider costs in 
determining significant contributions, the North Carolina decision 
qualified this ruling by holding that cost considerations could be 
used only to lower an upwind state’s obligation.111 The court 
reasoned that the Transport Rule, by imposing uniform cost 
requirements on all states no matter the actual amount of their 
significant contributions, could result in some states making 
reductions in excess of that required by the statute.112 
Second, the majority argued that the EPA’s simultaneous release 
of significant contributions and the federal implementation plan 
conflicted with the cooperative aim of the Clean Air Act.113 In 
support, the court noted that the good neighbor provision was 
located in the section of the Clean Air Act relating to the states, 
which suggested Congress intended this to be a state 
responsibility.114 Furthermore, the court cited the Virginia decision, 
where the court interpreted this section as a “federalism bar” that 
prevents the EPA from using the state implementation plan process 
to compel states to adopt specific control measures.115 Since this 
EPA action essentially made it impossible for states to submit an 
adequate plan by which to meet these good neighbor requirements, 
the court held that it infringed upon the states’ delegated role under 
the Act.116 
Lastly, the panel held that the EPA’s method of determining 
significant contributions violated the good neighbor provision’s 
mandate that a state be required to only make reductions equal to its 
own “significant contribution.”117 The panel’s “relativity 
requirement” meant that the EPA, in determining an upwind state’s 
contribution to a downwind state’s nonattainment, must factor in the 
relative contributions of other upwind states to that nonattainment, 
as well as the downwind state’s own contribution to its 
nonattainment.118 The court reasoned that the EPA’s uniform cost 
determination method clearly failed to account for these other 
considerations.119  
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2. Judge Rogers’ Dissent 
Judge Rogers penned a heated dissent in which she argued that 
the court lacked jurisdiction to hear the case because the petitioners 
raised an untimely challenge.120 Furthermore, she stressed that, even 
if jurisdiction had been proper, the invalidation of the Transport 
Rule was based on a faulty construction of the Clean Air Act and 
prior case law.121 
In her jurisdictional argument, Judge Rogers pointed to the clear 
judicial petition requirements of the Clean Air Act: petitioners 
wanting to challenge a final EPA determination must do so within 
sixty days of receiving such notice.122 In Judge Rogers’ view, the 
time to bring a challenge to the Transport Rule occurred when the 
EPA published its findings that the state implementation plans were 
inadequate in meeting good neighbor contributions.123 She further 
emphasized that these published findings rejected state objections 
that the EPA was statutorily required to notify the states of their 
good neighbor obligations before releasing a mandatory federal 
implementation plan.124 Since the sixty-day period had long since 
expired before the EPA implemented the Transport Rule, she argued 
that the petitioners had lost their chance for judicial review.125 Judge 
Rogers warned that the majority opinion ignored the two important 
policy reasons behind these strict procedural rules.126 First, these 
rules “enforce repose,” so that agency rulemaking is not hindered by 
unexpected challenges.127 Second, the statute aims to ensure an 
agency’s assessment and subsequent corrections of the rule before 
the issue goes to court.128 
Judge Rogers also disagreed with the majority rationale that the 
EPA was mandated to prospectively alert states of their significant 
contributions in light of the Michigan decision.129 She emphasized 
that, in Michigan, the court only held that the EPA acted permissibly 
in choosing to alert the states of their significant contributions before 
state implementation plans were to be submitted for agency 
review.130 Thus, she considered the majority to have erroneously 
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applied Michigan as its basis for holding that the EPA was now 
required to prospectively alert states of their significant 
contributions before reviewing state implementation plans.131  
Judge Rogers further rejected the majority’s statutory analysis 
that concluded that the Clean Air Act required the EPA to 
prospectively alert the states.132 She argued that the majority, in 
effect, rewrote 42 U.S.C. Section 7410(c) by finding such a 
requirement when nothing in that provision expressly includes such 
an obligation.133 Judge Rogers stressed that such an analysis 
conflicted with the established judicial interpretive principal 
regarding administrative statutes, in which the court is “not to 
correct the text so that it better serves the statute’s purposes.”134 In 
her view, the majority application conflicted with the congressional 
aims behind the 1990 Clean Air Act amendments, which intended to 
strengthen EPA regulatory authority because the states themselves 
had consistently failed to curb interstate pollution.135 
While Judge Rogers conceded that the EPA had previously 
allowed states the opportunity to submit state plans after releasing 
contribution amounts, she stressed that an agency may depart from 
previous rule interpretations if it presents “good reasons” for doing 
so.136 She argued that there were such reasons to support the EPA’s 
interpretive change in this instance.137 Justice Rogers particularly 
focused on the fact that the court in North Carolina had remanded 
rather then struck down the Clean Air Interstate Rule and that it 
“emphasized EPA’s obligation to remedy [the Rule’s] flaws 
expeditiously.”138 
Because of the complex nature of interstate air pollution, there is 
a common link between these three most recent D.C. Circuit 
decisions over the matter: all three cases involved judicial 
examination of immensely detailed EPA regulations relating to a 
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multi-faceted environmental problem. For these reasons, a concrete 
legal standard as to what is permissible under the good neighbor 
provision has not emerged after over a decade of jurisprudence over 
the issue.  
III. THE INCONSISTENCY OF THE EME HOMER RULING 
This Comment will now analyze the D.C. panel’s arguably 
flawed interpretation and application of the good neighbor provision 
in the EME Homer ruling, will relate it to the prior Michigan and 
North Carolina decisions, and discuss how that decision creates a 
number of adverse effects for successful future regulations. 
The majority opinion in EME Homer serves to bring further 
confusion to an already inconsistent body of case law regarding the 
good neighbor provision. Such a decision reiterates the idea that the 
D.C. Circuit has continually failed to ascertain, or even agree on, the 
true congressional intent behind this provision. This is evident from 
the fact that the EME Homer panel frequently referred to the 
Michigan ruling though a substantially similar rule was upheld in 
that case.139 Moreover, the court in EME Homer cited extensively to 
North Carolina for support despite the fact that the Transport Rule 
differs significantly from the Clean Air Interstate Rule addressed in 
that previous case.140 This uncertainty was further exacerbated by 
the majority’s erroneous use of both decisions to substantiate its 
rejection of the Transport Rule.  
A. Applying Michigan 
The court often referenced Michigan in its rejection of the 
EPA’s cost-based approach in the Transport Rule as a primary 
reason for disproving the EPA’s simultaneous release of the federal 
implementation plan and the states’ contributions.141 It must be 
pointed out, however, that the EME Homer court failed to explain 
how the Michigan court’s belief that the 1990 Clean Air Act 
Amendments expanded EPA regulatory authority over interstate 
pollution did not conflict with its current opinion, which severely 
restricted EPA authority over the same subject.142  
First, the majority’s use of Michigan to support the principle that 
the EPA may only consider costs to “further lower an individual 
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State’s obligations,”143 wholly ignores the Michigan court’s 
substantive discussion on that issue. The Michigan court concluded 
that, only in the absence of legislative preclusion, the EPA could 
factor in cost considerations to determine significant contributions.144 
The Michigan ruling never suggested that such considerations might 
only be used to lower a state’s good neighbor obligation as the 
majority concluded. Moreover, several petitioners in Michigan 
unsuccessfully argued that, since the program imposed a uniform 
cost reduction requirement on all upwind states, those states with 
minimal contributions would be forced to shoulder a greater 
reduction obligation.145 The fact that the Michigan court actually 
considered and rejected the same argument clearly indicates the 
decision is antithetical to the majority’s proposition. 
Next, the majority asserted that the EPA is obligated under the 
Clean Air Act to prospectively inform states of their contributions 
before requiring submissions of state implementation plans for 
review.146 It was reasoned that, since the Michigan court held that 
the EPA acted permissibly under the statute when it alerted the 
states before requiring submissions, the EPA was now required to 
take this approach in determining good neighbor obligations.147 The 
majority decision held that what was deemed a permissible EPA 
action under Michigan was now a mandatory obligation of the EPA. 
However, this again underscores the court’s flawed understanding 
and application of that decision.  
B. Applying North Carolina 
The court often pointed to the North Carolina holding as a basis 
for rejecting the Transport Rule.148 Principally, the majority relied 
on North Carolina to further support its point that the EPA could not 
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use costs in a way that would increase a state’s obligation under the 
good neighbor provision.149 Again, such an application misconstrues 
the actual holding in North Carolina.  
The North Carolina court’s invalidation of the Clean Air 
Interstate Rule centered around the issue that the EPA assigned 
emission reduction requirements based solely on how cheaply a 
state could make such reductions.150 Under the rule, states with more 
oil- and gas-powered utilities (states that could reduce emissions 
more cheaply) were subject to larger reduction requirements than 
states with mainly coal-fired utilities whose reductions were more 
costly.151 The court argued that the result of such an allocation 
method would be that “states with mainly oil- and gas-fired 
[utilities] will subsidize reductions in states with mainly coal-fired 
[utilities].”152  
The majority in EME Homer applied the North Carolina holding 
to support its own conclusion that cost considerations could never be 
used to increase an upwind state’s obligation; rather, cost 
considerations could be used only to reduce a state’s obligation.153 
Such reasoning obviously misconstrues the North Carolina decision 
and the Clean Air Interstate Rule it addressed. The North Carolina 
court simply made the sensible point that, as a result of cost 
considerations, the rule as it stood would unfairly shift the reduction 
burden to the detriment of certain states.154   
The burden-shifting element of the Clean Air Interstate Rule was 
notably absent from the Transport Rule, which imposed nearly 
uniform cost reductions on all upwind states.155 However, the 
majority in EME Homer still reasoned that the North Carolina 
decision was entirely relevant to reject the Transport Rule.156 
Moreover, the majority undermined its own application of North 
Carolina when remarking that the Michigan decision, in upholding 
the nitrogen oxide budget rule with similar uniform cost 
requirements, stood for the legitimate proposition that the EPA may 
use costs “in a way that benefits some [] States more than others.”157 
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However the EME Homer court failed to explain why this Michigan 
principle was not also furthered in the very similar Transport Rule. 
C. Potential Effects in the Aftermath of EME Homer 
While the challengers of the Transport Rule likely viewed the 
EME Homer decision as an important victory against overly 
intrusive federal regulation, the ruling poses serious concerns 
regarding the future success of interstate pollution regulation. First, 
the decision forces the EPA to begin from scratch in devising a new 
transport pollution plan, which will likely take several years to 
develop and implement.158 Such an extensive delay will likely have 
significant economic effects as electric utilities will likely be 
discouraged from investing in emissions reductions due to the 
uncertainty of future regulation. Moreover, by invalidating the 
Transport Rule, the EME Homer decision created clear winners and 
losers between the states, with Louisiana potentially being among 
the biggest losers.159 Such a plethora of serious problems evidences 
a clear need for substantial changes in interstate pollution regulation. 
1. Effects on EPA Transport Pollution Regulations 
The EPA is now charged with formulating a new transport 
pollution rule that fits under the Clean Air Act’s statutory 
framework as interpreted by the EME Homer panel. Specifically, 
this means complying with the following three principal directives 
emphasized by the court. First, the EPA must determine states’ good 
neighbor initial emission requirements based on the states’ total 
significant contributions to non-attainment in other states.160 Next, 
under the EME Homer majority’s proportionality requirement,161 an 
upwind state’s contribution must be adjusted in light of the other 
states’ share of contributions, as well as a downwind state’s relative 
contributions to its own non-attainment.162 Lastly, the EPA must 
abandon its federal implementation plan approach by giving the 
states a chance to implement the reduction requirements.163 The 
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EME Homer panel’s questionable rejection of the Transport Rule 
clearly begs the question of whether it is even possible for the EPA 
to implement a rule that would survive judicial review.  
An issue of particular concern in future successful regulation is 
the panel’s proportionality directive. Specifically, the EPA, from its 
own analyses of alternative transport control methods, has 
questioned whether such a requirement is even feasible.164 In her 
dissent, Judge Rogers made the very logical point that the 
requirement that the EPA engage in such detailed air quality 
analysis conflicted with the majority’s larger holding that the EPA 
avoid collective “over-control” within the states.165 Lastly, such a 
requirement further burdens the EPA’s already difficult task of 
regulating an immensely complex problem. 
Further, absent the slim chance of new federal legislation or a 
successful EPA appeal, the panel’s mandate that the EPA give states 
the initial opportunity to submit state implementation plans pushes 
back the timeline for new transport regulation.166 It is likely that the 
EPA will give the states at least two or three years to submit plans 
for approval after it finalizes a new rule.167 As a result, states will 
likely not need to be in compliance with the new regulations until 
sometime between 2016 and 2018.168 
2. Effects on Pollution Control Investments  
The EME Homer decision will also likely discourage utility 
company investments in emission controls for the foreseeable 
future. This is largely because the decision creates uncertainty as to 
the character and direction of transport pollution regulation.169 It is 
impossible to determine what risk such expenditures entail in the 
face of unknown regulations, so companies will refrain from making 
capital investments in power plant environmental controls.  
In contrast to the common belief that power companies lose 
money when having to invest in pollution controls, many utilities 
often profit by making prudent capital pollution control 
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investments.170 However, in order for these companies to determine 
whether this spending is worthwhile, detailed analyses must be 
conducted in order to predict the costs and expected benefits of 
employing new emissions controls.171 The most important factors in 
making such determinations include fuel prices, cost per ton 
amounts, and pollutant allowance prices.172 Because changes in 
environmental regulation could drastically affect these factors, 
companies must know the extent of EPA rules governing power 
plants to determine whether such investments are economically 
prudent.173 Thus, the regulatory unpredictability in the wake of EME 
Homer will deter the installation of pollution controls by the utility 
companies.  
3. Effects on Louisiana  
The EME Homer panel’s directive that the EPA, in determining 
a state’s significant contribution, must account for the relative 
contributions of the other states, creates clear winners and losers in 
the wake of the decision.174 More importantly, the decision suggests 
the likelihood of drastically increased pollution regulation in a few 
of the biggest losing states,175 including Louisiana.  
Specifically, these states share three characteristics indicating 
that they will be subject to the heaviest regulations under the EME 
Homer panel’s “relativity” requirement. First, these states contribute 
substantially to pollution levels in other states.176 Second, these 
states are also recipients of transport pollution from other states.177 
Lastly, these states have a substantial part in their own failures to 
meet national air quality levels because of their high in-state 
emissions.178   
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Louisiana, as the nation’s largest ozone contributor to other 
states nonattainment,179 along with playing a large part in the states’ 
failure in meeting its own ozone level,180 may possibly be the 
biggest loser from the EME Homer decision. Consequently, the state 
can expect that, if the EPA indeed promulgates a rule in compliance 
with the court’s holding, far greater reduction requirements in future 
regulations will follow. The prospect of harsher restrictions upon 
Louisiana’s pollution sources would likely have significant effects 
upon both the state and the country as a whole. Increased emissions 
reductions would jeopardize the viability of the Louisiana economy 
due to the energy intensive industries upon which the state 
depends.181 Because of Louisiana’s national importance as a leading 
producer of both petrochemicals182 and petroleum,183 increased 
regulations would also have widespread impacts around the country. 
Indeed, the EME Homer ruling (and the rationale supporting it) 
harms both the regulators and the regulated with regards to interstate 
pollution. The court’s muddled application of statutory and case law 
casts an uncertain cloud on future regulation, to the detriment of all 
interested parties. 
IV. THE CONGRESSIONAL AIM BEHIND THE GOOD NEIGHBOR 
PROVISION 
The Congressional Reports regarding the 1990 Clean Air Act 
Amendments provide a meaningful glimpse into the legislators’ 
respective intentions of the revisions involving interstate air 
pollution. Senator Joseph Lieberman of Connecticut, a downwind 
state, argued that the expansion of the EPA’s regulatory authority 
over interstate pollution was necessary to incentivize the states into 
reducing pollution that affected other states.184 In opposing the 
revisions, Senator Rockefeller of West Virginia, an upwind state, 
emphasized that the proposed changes placed too great a burden on 
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the polluting states requiring that they “pay more than [their] fair 
share.”185 
The Amendments passed, indicating that, by 1990, Congress 
understood that interstate air pollution was a serious problem 
requiring a substantial policy change. The good neighbor 
provision’s amended language reflected this view.186 By adopting 
the more ambiguous “contribute significantly” language and 
expanding the provision’s application to a greater amount of 
emissions activities, Congress intended a greater federal regulatory 
role.187  
A. The D.C. Circuit Failed to Defer to the Environmental Protection 
Agency’s Delegated Authority 
With the 1990 Amendments, Congress aimed to approach 
interstate air pollution as a nationwide problem. The EME Homer 
court, by strongly reiterating the states’ role within the Clean Air 
Act,188 appeared to blatantly ignore this specific legislative intent. 
The court’s decision to disregard Congress’ focus on a nationwide 
solution was further accompanied by the court’s willingness to 
ignore established principles of judicial restraint within 
administrative law.189 
The Supreme Court ruling in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural 
Resources Defense Council, Inc., served as a natural reaction to the 
general character of judicial review in the area of administrative law 
during the 1970s and 1980s.190 During that period, the lower federal 
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courts, particularly the D.C. Circuit, often struggled in clearly 
defining the scope of review regarding administrative regulations.191 
In Chevron, the Court aimed to reign in the lower courts from 
exercising overly intrusive judicial review over regulations that 
either complied with, or did not conflict with, congressional intent 
behind administrative statutes.192  
The Court thus formulated a two-step approach designed to 
increase judicial deference toward agency rulemaking authority.193 
First, the court is to determine whether “Congress has directly 
spoken to the precise question at issue.”194 If so, then the reviewing 
court must enforce that clear legislative intent.195 However, in the 
event that the intent is not clear from the statute, the reviewing court 
must uphold the agency’s interpretation if it is “reasonable.”196 
Moreover, even if the court does not consider the agency 
interpretation to be the best policy in addressing the specific issue, 
the court still must uphold a reasonable agency rule.197 The Court 
reasoned that the “wisdom of such policy choices” is not judicial, 
but political questions, and should be resolved in the political 
branches.198 
By holding the Transport Rule impermissible under the Clean 
Air Act and instructing the EPA to formulate a rule according to its 
own interpretation of the good neighbor provision, the EME Homer 
panel blatantly ignored the Chevron principle. The legislative 
history of the 1990 Clean Air Act unquestionably shows that 
Congress, in recognizing the severity and complexity of the 
interstate pollution problem, intended to accord the EPA greater 
authority in its regulation.  
The EME Homer panel’s rejection of the Transport Rule 
replaces the EPA’s policy choices with the court’s own. Further, the 
unelected panel’s infringement on the EPA’s policy-making role is 
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only worsened by the fact that the court’s own preferences, 
particularly the panel’s “relativity requirement,” appear unsupported 
by Congress. 
The EME Homer panel’s requirement that the EPA, in 
determining a specific state’s significant contribution must take into 
account the relative emissions from all other upwind and downwind 
states, failed to consider the impact of the 1990 good neighbor 
provision. As the Michigan court alluded, by adopting the 
“contribute significantly” standard, Congress moved away from the 
causation-based approach in order to expand state and EPA 
authority to regulate in this area.199 The D.C. Circuit’s failure to 
understand the complexity involved in the interstate pollution 
problem is evident considering that the EPA argued that such an 
approach is likely impossible. Moreover, this relativity requirement, 
if allowed to stand, leaves the EPA far more vulnerable to future 
challenges, as the agency will be burdened with expressly showing 
how it determined each precise significant contribution level 
through environmental data. 
B. The EME Homer Panel’s Ruling Incents States to Challenge 
Future Regulation 
The EME Homer court’s emphasis on the cooperative nature of 
the Clean Air Act suggests that future interstate pollution regulation 
will be consistently hampered by judicial challenges. Indeed, 
Congress envisioned a cooperative relationship between the states 
and the federal government, acknowledging that both were needed 
to reduce air pollution.200 However, it is also true that Congress 
recognized that some air pollution problems, because of their 
national scope, are often better solved through increased federal 
involvement.201 The particular nature of transport pollution clearly 
places it in this latter category. 
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Interstate pollution is not only a national problem, but because of 
the various effects it poses to different states and regions, legislative 
measures addressing the problem are highly controversial. Since 
states have different incentives in regulating interstate pollution,202 
compromise is often difficult or impossible. It logically follows that a 
cooperative-based approach will be inefficient to solve such a 
problem. Congress recognized this issue and opted to shift greater 
authority towards the federal government in order to better solve 
trans-boundary pollution. 
The EME Homer court’s reliance on the state’s role within the 
good neighbor provision ignores the clear legislative intent in the 
1990 good neighbor provision. The panel continually emphasized 
that the EPA acted impermissibly in simultaneously releasing the 
significant contribution amounts and the federal implantation 
plan.203 However, as the EPA remarked, the federal implementation 
plan was largely in response to the complete failure of the upwind 
states in making adequate reductions.204 This clear unwillingness on 
the part of the states was precisely what Congress aimed to remedy 
through the 1990 Amendments.205 In reinforcing the states’ role 
within the Clean Air Act, the panel’s decision provides the states 
with substantial leverage in future judicial disputes over the good 
neighbor provision. In this light, the decision ignites a major 
problem involved in interstate pollution, which Congress clearly 
aimed to remedy. 
C. Salvaging Interstate Pollution Regulation and Congressional 
Intent 
Absent legislative clarification or a reversal of the EME Homer 
panel, the EPA must now formulate a new transport rule pursuant to 
the strict direction of the D.C. Circuit. It appears that the EPA’s best 
chance of formulating a rule within the court’s relativity requirement 
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would incorporate a “command and control” method of regulation.206 
Under such an approach, the EPA would carefully detail the exact 
emissions reductions of each upwind state, and then mandate those 
states meet those emissions caps. However, such regulation programs 
are routinely criticized by economists because of their high 
administrative costs and for being far less efficient than incentive-
based programs such as emissions trading.207  
The EPA may also be able to implement a permissible transport 
scheme involving intrastate emissions credit trading programs. 
Under these programs, pollution sources could undertake projects 
that reduce emissions and then obtain EPA approval to sell those 
emissions to other sources within the same state that cannot meet 
emission standards. This would allow certain states a limited amount 
of flexibility in meeting the state-focused reduction budgets 
mandated in EME Homer. However, such a trading program would 
only work in those states with diversified pollution sources where 
those who can reduce emissions more cheaply are encouraged to 
invest in pollution control and sell surplus emissions to other 
sources. Moreover, these sorts of programs contain several 
drawbacks not shared in traditional cap-and-trade systems.208  
Lastly, the EPA could possibly incorporate a modified cap-and-
trade scheme into the next Transport Rule. For such a system to 
comply with EME Homer, trading would have to be strictly limited 
between states. The trading system could allow upwind states to 
only purchase excess allowances from the downwind states they 
pollute. Thus, in the event an upwind state pollution source 
exceeded its allowable emissions and needed to purchase allowances 
to cover this excess, forcing the source to purchase from a 
downwind source would offset this increased contribution. 
However, such a trading program is likely unfeasible, as it would 
add greater complexity to the EPA’s already immensely difficult 
task after EME Homer.  
The limited amount of expensive and inefficient regulatory 
schemes from which the EPA must choose after EME Homer further 
suggests that the decision conflicts with both legislative intent and 
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common sense. It would be absurd to assume that Congress, in 
addressing interstate pollution, intended to burden the EPA with 
unnecessary hurdles. Rather, Congress saw interstate pollution for 
what it was: a nation-wide problem, demanding a collective approach. 
What also must be acknowledged, and something Congress very 
likely understood, is that many heavy polluting industries are of vital 
national importance. Thus, by allowing the EPA to address interstate 
pollution through nationally- or regionally-based trading programs, 
certain polluters would be encouraged to make emissions reductions 
that benefit industry while also effectively addressing the pollution 
problem. The EME Homer panel apparently did not agree. 
CONCLUSION 
Time and again, judicial review in the administrative realm is 
described as inconsistent and uncertain. The Court, in Chevron, aimed 
to remedy this inconsistency by creating a presumption of judicial 
deference towards agency action. Alas, courts have reverted back to 
replacing an agency’s policy choices with its own in the review of 
administrative actions despite the twenty-five-year-old decision of 
Chevron. Such behavior characterized the EME Homer panel’s 
decision to put its own spin on the good neighbor provision’s 
“significantly contribute” language. Thus, the EPA is sent back to the 
drawing board in attempt to formulate a rule consistent with the 
court’s, not the legislature’s, definition of that language. So now who 
is deferring to whom? 
Alexander Bickel, in his critique of judicial activism tells us that 
“[t]he root difficulty is that judicial review is a counter-majoritarian 
force in our system.”209 Nowhere is the principal of judicial restraint 
more important than in the administrative law context. Congress 
accords substantial powers to the EPA because the agency is faced 
with addressing nationwide environmental issues. As such, the EPA 
is charged with formulating policies that protect the environmental 
health of the country without crippling the energy-intensive industries 
that are vital to a healthy economy. It is both a difficult and delicate 
task, which is certainly not aided by overly intrusive judicial review. 
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